Reshaping the Collateral Management Landscape

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Reshaping the Collateral Management Landscape
Around the globe, new players are emerging to reshape how collateral is employed. As central counterparties (CCPs) are introduced as intermediaries in the derivatives markets, and governmental and quasi-governmental agencies around the globe increase their use of collateral, how will the collateral management landscape change?

The emergence of CCPs as crucial intermediaries

The use of a CCP, once optional, will become mandatory for the majority of over-the-counter (OTC) transactions as a result of G20 recommendations—forever changing the OTC derivatives markets. Regulatory initiatives such as mandatory clearing required by Dodd-Frank and European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) will reshape the role of CCPs. From their inception as industry utilities meant to deliver process efficiencies, CCPs will evolve to become core business enablers that allow regulators to isolate certain risks in fewer institutions.

As a result, buy-side clients in particular will want to understand how the new role of the CCPs will change the market risk profile. In the bilateral market, a firm collateralizing a transaction is exposed to that single counterparty. The new CCP model transforms multiple bilateral exposures into a single exposure to a CCP or clearing broker, thus creating another potential risk— namely that a participant's collateral would be exposed to a mutualization risk and thus share in any losses should the margin posted by a defaulting member be insufficient.

In response, regulators have started to define new customer collateral segregation models (such as the "Legal Segregation With Operational Commingling Model" or LSOC) that will mitigate some of those risks. Regulators are presently redefining the risk equilibrium, which traditionally meant that central risk management coincided with loss sharing between the clearing participants and their clients.

This process is not yet complete. Recently, new international principles have been issued that will make market infrastructures such as CCPs subject to additional capital requirements to cover business risk beyond requisite coverage for liquidity and credit risk that already exists.

Together, these represent a shift in how CCPs are viewed. CCPs have traditionally been subject to a minimal level of internationally agreed standards of supervision. Regulators have stayed neutral to the form and degree of market consolidation and their business models.

Now, however, the increased importance of CCPs to financial stability is likely to trigger even more changes, given that so much activity will be concentrated in relatively few institutions. For example, sources and composition of revenues and CCPs' profit structures will become increasingly relevant to regulators as different revenue streams pose different risks to the organization.

Key Considerations in Evaluating CCPs
A market participant faces an important choice when it selects a clearing partner for its business. In making this decision, it's important to understand clearly the obligations of the CCP during business-as-usual market conditions and during times of market stress. While CCP defaults have been rare, they are not unprecedented, and understanding how the CCP will meet its obligations is an essential part of making an informed decision.

Within the present regulatory framework, CCPs employ a number of risk mitigation tools including access restrictions, collateralization, capital and loss mutualization (through the default fund contribution) that collectively are referred to as the "risk waterfall."

This establishes a priority to how available funds are used, and may differ by CCP, which may have different available financial resources. Dodd-Frank and EMIR both contain detailed provisions setting forth, for example, minimum capital requirements for CCPs and the size of the default fund. However, CCPs do not present a uniform risk profile to participants as they are not required to have a uniform structure.

In assessing the risk profile of individual CCPs, institutions will want to understand:
  • The reinvestment policy: CCPs are principally allowed to reinvest the collateral received by the participants, which can then (partly) be executed in unsecured form.
  • Handling of non-cash collateral: Traditionally, accepting non-cash collateral was not considered to be a strength of CCPs. The implementation of more robust solutions, perhaps utilizing tri-party models, will reduce operational risk for the parties involved.
  • Adoption of international messaging standards: Historically, CCPs have relied on proprietary communication formats. The incremental option of international standards (such as SWIFT) may help to reduce the risk of processing errors.
  • Insolvency law: The effectiveness of asset segregation models for CCP collateral, as well as the feasibility of portability, depends on the legal framework.
Regulations recognize that there can be differences in terms of safety, even after Dodd-Frank and EMIR are implemented. For example, proposed Basel III rules concerning the capitalization of exposures to CCPs clearly distinguish between qualifying and non-qualifying CCPs. These rules require banks to hold higher capital for cleared exposures if the CCP does not meet certain operational and business requirements (for example, regarding collateral arrangements).

As market participants take a prudent approach to picking the right CCP that offers them the best risk-reward profile, this can have an important effect on the overall market structure. There is a general concern that too many CCPs may undermine netting and operational benefits and thus increase the cost to the market. High selection standards for CCPs would seem to be an effective means of discouraging excess proliferation, as those CCPs who operate in the safest possible way are likely to accumulate most of the new clearing activity that is likely to result from OTC reforms.

Increased utilization of collateral by government or quasi-government agencies

Although CCPs are garnering significant attention, they are by no means the only new players that seek to complement their business activities with more robust arrangements to manage non-cash collateral. Increasingly, government agencies, central banks and monetary authorities are turning to tri-party repo or other collateralized transactions to support international expansion or to support monetary policies, while government-sponsored pension funds are using collateral to safeguard against market volatility and counterparty defaults.

These relative newcomers as clients in the collateral management space are reaping the time-tested benefits of tri-party repo, including the flexibility that is the hallmark of this structure, to meet very particular needs.

For example:

  • The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) recently employed tri-party repo and collateral in order to support the international expansion of the Hong Kong repo financing market. In partnership with J.P. Morgan, the HKMA developed a repo financing collateral management program that connects members of Hong Kong's Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) with international financial institutions. This offers members an enhanced liquidity platform for local currencies— Reminbi (CNH), EUR, HKD and USD &mdask; against a broad spectrum of international securities. The ability to utilize Hong Kong's Real Time Gross Settlement system for cash settlements gives repo buyers and sellers the ability to settle cash during Hong Kong business hours. According to Kirit Bhatia, J.P. Morgan head of technical sales, Asia ex-Japan, "The HKMA expects this program to grow substantially over time across Asia and globally. A key objective of the program is to support the internationalization of the CNY (offshore) by providing market participants with direct access to local liquidity. In practical terms, this allows program participants holding assets outside of Hong Kong to use those positions as collateral to obtain RMB in Hong Kong." It is expected that this infrastructure will assist in further developing the secondary RMB securities market.
  • Also in Asia-Pacific, central banks and monetary authorities are collateralizing their repo and OTC derivatives trades and using an independent agent to manage the associated risks. Increasingly, the emphasis is on ensuring that transactions are properly collateralized throughout their tenure, managing daily mark-to-market and variation margin calculations, and ensuring an efficient and accurate margin call process.

    In addition, contributions to pension funds are mandatory for workers in certain Asia-Pacific countries. These funds seek to effectively use derivatives to manage against market volatility and utilize collateral to manage counterparty risk (including the potential risk of a counterparty default).
New trends, new players

As markets continue to change in response to global pressures and new regulations, participants face a heightened need to find effective tools to manage their non-cash collateral. For non-traditional participants, such as government agencies and quasigovernmental institutions, the answer is to seek assistance from collateral agents who have time-honored and efficient solutions to manage operational, credit and counterparty risk on an enterprisewide basis, regardless of the underlying transaction or security.

For others, the advent of mandatory clearing introduces a new and more complex market
Support for Asia-Pacific Pension Funds
Four large superannuation funds in Australia and New Zealand recently engaged J.P. Morgan to support their efforts with end-to-end third party derivatives collateral management. The funds are looking to manage their exposure and expenses while mitigating operational, credit and counterparty risk. According to Blair Harrison, J.P. Morgan's head of collateral management for Asia-Pacific, this was a key consideration. "Recent volatility and counterparty defaults have reinforced the need for timely and appropriate collateralization of counterparty exposures, both for superannuation funds and asset managers," he notes. "Investors are seeking quality collateral that is constantly valued and administered against their obligations."
paradigm. As CCPs replace bilateral collateralization for certain transactions, they effectively become counterparties in their own right. This puts additional pressures on the CCP to manage a substantially increased volume of collateral, a challenge that the tri-party structure is uniquely suited to address. In sum, a heightened need to effectively manage all assets is creating a newly diverse group of counterparties, as institutions seek to manage specific exposures by linking into established, flexible and scalable collateral management solutions.

Werner
Swen Werner
Senior Product Manager,
Collateral Management

Thought
, Fall 2012
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